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I. INTRODUCTION
South Carolina is experiencing the greatest construction
boom in its history. Construction permits for the first six months
of 1973 totaled $110,911,600 compared with $86,773,900 during
the same period in 1972.' Over 50,000 South Carolinians are em-
ployed in the construction industry, and employment is expected
to reach 64,500 by 1975.2 The only insurance most of these indi-
viduals have that they will be paid for their labor or materials
furnished and used in the improvement of real estate is the lien
granted by the South Carolina mechanics' lien statutes.
3
The statutes which now comprise chapter 5 of title 45 of the
South Carolina Code were not enacted at the same time, and
their joinder has resulted in inconsistencies not yet reconciled by
judicial interpretation. No other statutes in the South Carolina
Code govern the disposition of so much money and affect the
rights of so many individuals, while remaining a monument dedi-
cated to "the inaccuracy of language."' 4 It is the purpose of this
article to explore the scope and operation of the South Carolina
mechanics' lien statutes and the priorities accorded the parties
affected.
H. SCOPE AND OPERATION OF THE MECHANICS' LmN STATUTES
A mechanic's lien is
a charge on land, given by statute to the persons named therein,
to secure a priority or preference of payment for the performance
1. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA BUREAU OF BUSINESS & ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 20 Bus.
& ECON. REV. 16 (Oct. 1973).
2. SOUTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMM'N, MANPOwER: REQUIREMErs AND
RESOURCES IN S.C. 7 (Supp. Rpt. 1971). These figures are taken from the contract construc-
tion industry division which includes:
(1) general building (residential, industrial, commercial and other buildings);
(2) heavy construction (highways and streets, bridges, sewers, and other heavy
construction); and (3) special trade contractors (plumbing, heating, masonry,
carpentry, plastering, painting and other special trades).
Id. Significantly, these figures do not reflect the large number of suppliers and material-
men whose rights are also governed by the mechanics' lien statutes, but they do include
mechanics who labor and supply on public improvements that are exempt from the stat-
utes.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-251 to -293 (1962).
4. "[Tjhere is not a more fruitful source of error in law than the inaccuracy of
language." Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 29, 96 S.E. 407, 414 (1918). This
statement was precipitated by a conflict between the mechanics' lien statutes and the
Recording Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 60-101 et seq. (1962).
[Vol. 25
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MECHANICS' LIENS
of labor or supply of materials to buildings or other improve-
ments to be enforced against the particular property in which
they have become incorporated ... .5
Without the mechanics' lien statutes, suppliers of materials and
labor to improvements of real property possess only a contractual
remedy to secure payment. When the mechanic contracts directly
with the owner, the statutes create a lien against real property for
the value of the labor or materials furnished to the improvement
without the necessity of the supplier first obtaining a personal
judgment.' Frequently the laborers and suppliers have dealt with
a contractor or some similar person and have no right to collect
against the owner who has received the benefit of their services.
The statutes also protect these people by granting a lien against
the owner's property, even though they would not be entitled to
a personal judgment.7
A. Creation of the Mechanic's Lien
The mechanic's lien is purely a statutory right; hence its cre-
ation is governed by the terms of the statute. Although the terms
of the two types of liens in South Carolina differ slightly, both
liens are created at the time labor or material is furnished. Under
section 45-251, "a lien founded on a debt due for labor performed
or for materials furnished is not created until the labor is per-
formed or the material furnished." 8 "The instant the labor or
material is furnished, that instant the lien is created betwixt the
two parties to the transaction."' Under section 45-252, "[tlhe
materialman's lien, or rather his right to a lien, arises, inchoate,
when the material is furnished . . . ."10 In both cases, however,
little or no effect is given to the naked right; to enforce this right
the lienor must notify the owner, serve and record a certificate of
lien within ninety days after he ceases to furnish labor or materi-
als, and bring suit to foreclose the lien within six months of the
date he last furnishes labor or materials. 1
5. S. PHILLIPS, MECHANICS' LIENS § 9 (3d ed. 1893) [hereinafter cited as PHILLIPS].
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-251 (1962).
7. Id. § 45-252.
8. Willard v. Finch, 123 S.C. 56, 59, 116 S.E. 96, 97 (1923).
9. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 30, 96 S.E. 407, 414 (1918).
10. Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co., 229 S.C. 619, 629, 93 S.E.2d
855, 860 (1956).
11. The enforcement procedures are the same for either of the two types of liens.
Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co., 229 S.C. 619, 93 S.E.2d 855 (1956)
19741
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B. Persons Entitled to a Mechanic's Lien
The South Carolina statutes recognize two types of mechan-
ics' liens-the section 45-251 lien designed to protect the me-
chanic who deals directly with the owner and the section 45-252
lien designed to protect the mechanic who deals with the general
contractor (hereinafter referred to as contractor) or some person
other than the owner or his agent. These liens differ not so much
in terms of the class of persons protected as in the degree of
protection afforded. The significant distinction between the sec-
tion 45-251 lien and the section 45-252 lien is that the latter is
limited to the "amount due by the owner on the contract price of
the improvement made. 112 It is therefore advantageous for a me-
chanic to qualify for a section 45-251 lien and avoid the owner's
limited liability.
Section 45-251's requires that a debt be due for labor per-
formed or materials furnished by virtue of an agreement with, or
by consent of, the owner. If the mechanic has not contracted
directly with the owner, his sole basis for entitlement to a section
45-251 lien is the furnishing of labor or materials "by consent of,
the owner." The meaning of "consent" has caused much of the
litigation surrounding entitlement to this lien. When an owner
authorizes the improvement of his real estate, all labor or materi-
als furnished to that end could be viewed as having been per-
formed by consent of the owner. In a series of cases14 culminating
in Guignard Brick Works v. Gantt,'5 however, the court has de-
fined "consent" to require a contract between the mechanic and
(lien under § 45-252); Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 96 S.E. 407 (1918) (lien
under § 45-251).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1962).
13. Section 45-251 of the code provides:
Any person to whom a debt is due for labor performed or furnished or for
materials furnished and actually used in the erection, alteration or repair of any
building or structure upon any real estate or the boring and equipping of wells,
by virtue of an agreement with, or by consent of, the owner of such building or
structure, or any person having authority from, or rightfully acting for, such
owner in procuring or furnishing such labor or materials shall have a lien upon
such building or structure and upon the interest of the owner thereof in the lot
of land upon which it is situated to secure the payment of the debt so due to
him, and the costs which may arise in enforcing this lien under this chapter,
except as is otherwise provided herein.
14. Metz v. Critcher, 86 S.C. 348, 68 S.E. 627 (1910); Builders Supply Co. v. North
Augusta Elec. & Improvement Co., 71 S.C. 361, 51 S.E. 231 (1905); Geddes v. Bowden,
19 S.C. 1 (1882); Gray v. Walker, 16 S.C. 143 (1881).
15. 251 S.C. 29, 159 S.E.2d 850 (1968).
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the owner.
Consent. . . implies something more than a mere acquiescence
in a state of things already in existence. It implies an agreement
to that which, but for the consent, could not exist, and in which
the party consenting has a right to forbid. 6
The facts in Guignard demonstrate the difficulty of judicially
interpreting a statutory scheme designed to protect both the
owner and the mechanic. Gantt, the owner, hired Van Builders,
Inc., to construct a house for $19,000. Van began construction and
Guignard sold it 22,000 bricks on open account. Thereafter, Van
abandoned construction and Gantt, knowing Van had not paid
Guignard," completed his home with the bricks. Guignard con-
tended that this action constituted consent of the owner under
section 45-251.11 The court rejected this contention, relying in
part on the above quoted definition of consent.
This definition of consent demonstrates Guignard's predica-
ment under section 45-251. To qualify for a mechanic's lien, Guig-
nard had to have furnished the bricks by consent of Gantt. Guig-
nard, however, only contended that Gantt's consent arose when
the bricks were used by Gantt with knowledge that they had not
been paid for.'" Because this consent was subsequent to the fur-
nishing of the bricks, the court held that there was no section 45-
251 consent. The court's definition of consent, "acquiescence in
a state of things already in existence," hints that the alleged
consent arose after the furnishing. It thus appears that to qualify
for a mechanic's lien under section 45-251 the consent must be
obtained before the labor or materials are furnished. This require-
ment implies that the mechanic must contract with the owner
and renders the words by consent of the owner meaningless."
The court stated, "[I]t is clear that at the time the contract
16. Gray v. Walker, 16 S.C. 143, 147 (1881), quoted in Guignard Brick Works v.
Gantt, 251 S.C. at 32, 159 S.E.2d at 851.
17. Gantt knew that Guignard had not been paid because: "He called [Guignard's]
office and ascertained that no amount had been paid on any of the brick, on the yard or
in place. At his request Guignard sent him a bill for the entire 22,000 brick, totaling
$921.85." Record at 4 (emphasis added). This statement is a clear manifestation of Gantt's
consent to the use of the bricks.
18. See pp. 829-31 infra for a discussion of why Guignard's possible section 45-252
lien would have been unenforceable.
19. 251 S.C. at 31, 159 S.E.2d at 851.
20. This argument was raised by Guignard on appeal to the supreme court. "It is
respectfully submitted that the word 'consent' must mean something less than agreement
or the legislature would not have included it in the act." Brief for Appellant at 3.
1974]
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was abandoned by Van, Guignard had no even inchoate right to
a mechanic's lien. ' 21 Instead of attempting to ascertain what, if
any, action by Guignard would entitle it to a section 45-251 lien,
however, the court decided to base its reasoning on the passing
of title. Title is not an element of section 45-251; all that is re-
quired is a debt due for furnishing materials by consent of the
owner. The court is on firm ground when it speaks of there having
been no consent at the time of furnishing, but to talk of title to
the bricks as if that governed the lien is both unnecessary and
confusing.22
Under previous South Carolina cases it was clear that the
owner's consent to the improvement of his land was not sufficient
to create a section 45-251 lien for all those who furnished labor
and materials. The significance of Guignard is that, once materi-
als have been furnished, the owner's consent to the use of specific
materials with knowledge that the supplier has not been paid will
not entitle the mechanic to a section 45-251 lien.23 The court has
therefore not deviated from its earlier interpretation that the me-
chanic must contract with the owner.
"[Ilt is difficult to understand how a lien can be created unless
there be some debt to be secured by it, and to create a debt there
must be some contract (agreement), either express or implied."
It may, therefore, be assumed, as matter of course, as be-
tween the furnisher and the landowner dealing directly with
each other, that there can be no lien except there shall first be
a contract betwixt him who furnishes and him who receives.u
In Gantt v. Van der Hoek,25 a materialman claimed entitle-
ment to a section 45-251 lien on the basis of a contract with
21. 251 S.C. at 32, 159 S.E.2d at 851. The court must mean that Guignard had no
even inchoate right to a section 45-251 mechanic's lien because it could have qualified for
an unenforceable section 45-252 mechanic's lien. See discussion pp. 829-31 infra.
22. The title reasoning was probably used only to distinguish the case of Rapid
Fireproof Door Co. v. Largo Corp., 243 N.Y. 482, 154 N.E. 531 (1926) which had been cited
by Guignard. The discussion of title could be justified if it was meant to refute the idea
that there was a second furnishing by Guignard after receipt of Gantt's phone call. If this
was the court's concern it should have discussed the concept of furnishing and the party
most deserving protection in this situation, rather than the passing of title.
23. Although many states use the words contract or agreement with "consent," there
is a split of authority as to whether consent will be valid to take the place of contracting.
53 AMf. Jun. 2d Mechanics' Liens §§ 115-18 (1970); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 52
(1948).
24. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 30, 96 S.E. 407, 414 (1918), quoting in
part from Geddes v. Bowden, 19 S.C. 1, 5 (1882).
25. 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E.2d 267 (1968).
[Vol. 25
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Gantt. Atlas Lumber Company refused to furnish materials to
Van der Hoek (Van Builders) unless Gantt guaranteed to pay
$6,000 jointly to Atlas Lumber Company and Van Builders.
Gantt so agreed in the following statement: "I, William A. Gantt,
agrees [sic] with the abovenamed Corporation to pay at comple-
tion of contract a part of the total sum to Atlas Lumber Co., Inc.,
and Van's Builders Inc. jointly for the amount of Six Thousand
Dollars ($6,000.00)."26 This agreement was drafted by Van der
Hoek and signed by Gantt. Although Atlas furnished all materi-
als because of this agreement with Gantt, the supreme court held
that Atlas was not entitled to a mechanic's lien.27
The supreme court reasoned that a condition of the agree-
ment, Van's completion of the contract, never occurred. 2 In
South Carolina a mechanic must not only contract with the
owner, but the contract must also be enforceable. The existence
of the contract between Atlas and Gantt was not sufficient to
evidence Gantt's "consent" within the meaning of section 45-251
because the only consent or agreement given was that contained
in the statement quoted above. "Since the condition contained in
the statement signed by Gantt never occurred, no liability arose
against Gantt in favor of Atlas under Section 45-251 of the
Code."12
The cases of Guignard and Van der Hoek indicate that the
26. Id. at 311, 162 S.E.2d at 269 (emphasis added).
27. The court first determined that Van Der Hoek was not the agent of Gantt. This
finding was necessary for the purpose of construing the ambiguity in the agreement-an
ambiguous clause in a contract is construed against the drafter. The supreme court held
that Van der Hoek was an independent contractor who "assumed the responsibility and
risk incident to the construction of the residence," and not Gantt's agent. 251 S.C. at 314,
162 S.E.2d at 271.
Although the court was only concerned with general agency law and not the mechan-
ics' lien statutes, a contractor should never be considered the agent of the owner under
section 45-251. If the contractor is considered a person "having authority from, or right-
fully acting for" the owner, all mechanics would be entitled to section 45-251 liens thereby
circumventing the section 45-254 requirement that the aggregate amount of liens not
exceed the contract price. Section 45-251 should be interpreted to mean any person other
than the contractor.
See ORE. REv. STAT. § 87.005 (1971) for treatment of all contractors and subcontrac-
tors as statutory agents of the owner.
28. 251 S.C. at 319, 162 S.E.2d at 273.
29. Id. This is an overly restrictive interpretation of section 45-251. Even though a
condition of the agreement never occurred, the agreement itself should be sufficient evi-
dence of Gantt's consent to the furnishing of materials by Atlas. It is apparent that the
court is determined to give no legal effect to the words "by consent of, the owner" unless
the mechanic possesses an enforceable contract.
1974]
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supreme court is greatly concerned with the protection of owners
and the granting of liens to mechanics not contemplated by the
legislature. The golden rule of intepretation of the mechanics' lien
statutes for entitlement to a lien is: "It is elementary that statu-
tory liens may not be extended by courts to include the claims of
persons not specified by the statute. He who sets up such a lien
must bring himself fairly within the expressed intention of the
lawmakers."3" The supreme court has determined that the ex-
pressed intention of the lawmakers is that the owner must have
entered into an enforceable contract with a mechanic to entitle
the mechanic to a section 45-251 lien.
C. Labor and Materials for Which the Mechanic's Lien is Given
There has been little litigation in South Carolina concerning
the type of labor and materials for which a mechanic is entitled
to a lien. Under section 45-251 a mechanic is entitled to a lien "for
labor performed or furnished or for materials furnished and ac-
tually used in the erection, alteration or repair of any building or
structure upon any real estate or the boring and equipping of
wells . . . . "I Section 45-252 authorizes a lien by a "laborer,
mechanic, subcontractor or person furnishing material for the
improvement of real estate. . . to the value of the labor or mate-
rial so furnished."3 There is some ambiguity in measuring me-
chanic lien applicability by the standard of "material or labor; ,
33
however, there appears to be sufficient flexibility to allow the
mechanic recovery for closely related incidental expenses.
3 4
The South Carolina General Assembly has recently elimi-
30. Guignard Brick Works v. Gantt, 251 S.C. at 32, 159 S.E.2d at 851 (1968), quoting
Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 34, 96 S.E. 407, 415 (1918).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-251 (1962).
32. Id. § 45-252.
33. In construing the class of persons contemplated by the mechanics' lien statutes,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that an architect furnishing plans and super-
vising construction of the building and also a person supervising the purchase of materials
and the employment of laborers are entitled to liens. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110
S.C. 1, 96 S.E. 407 (1918). Nineteenth century cases held that a subcontractor of a
subcontractor, Geddes v. Bowden, 19 S.C. 1 (1882), and a laborer employed by the builder,
Gray v. Walker, 16 S.C. 143 (1881), were not entitled to mechanics' liens. Subsequently
section 45-252, protecting mechanics dealing with some person other than the owner, was
adopted to extend coverage to subcontractors. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1962);
Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co., 299 S.C. 619, 632, 93 S.E.2d 855, 861
(1956).
34. See PHILLIPS §§ 153-75 for a discussion of the problems other courts have faced
in determining what expenses are secured by mechanics' liens.
[Vol. 25
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nated a possible problem area by granting a lien for pre-
construction labor. Section 45-251 was amended to provide:
As used in this section, labor performed or furnished in the
erection, alteration or repair of any building or structure upon
any real estate shall include the work of making such real estate
suitable as a site for such building or structure. Such work shall
be deemed to include, but not limited to, the grading, bulldoz-
ing, leveling, excavating and filling of land (including the fur-
nishing of fill soil), the grading and paving of curbs and side-
walks, the construction of ditches and other drainage facilities
and the laying of pipes and conduits for water, gas, electric,
sewage and drainage purposes.35
Unfortunately section 45-252 was not so amended. This inconsis-
tency raises the issue of whether a mechanic who deals with the
owner's contractor is also entitled to a lien for the above-
mentioned pre-construction expenses. Strict statutory interpreta-
tion would deny a section 45-252 lien for this type work, but there
is no justification for not extending coverage to the mechanic
who deals with the contractor. The language of section 45-252,
"laborer, mechanic, subcontractor or person furnishing material
for the improvement of real estate . . ."36 is certainly broad
enough to include these expenses. In addition, both sections 45-
251 and 45-252 were amended to include the costs which may
arise in enforcing the lien plus reasonable attorneys' fees in an
amount determined by the trial judge. The attorneys' fees and
court costs cannot exceed the amount of the lien.
37
Those who furnish fixtures3 7-1 in connection with the erection,
alteration or repair of any building, 38 or to the improvement of
any real estate39 are entitled both to a mechanic's lien and to a
security interest under article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.40 The supplier should perfect a security interest because
35. No. 75, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 80.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-252 (1962).
37. No. 75, [19731 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 80.
37.1. See Carroll v. Britt, 227 S.C. 9, 86 S.E.2d 612 (1955) for a definition of fixtures
in South Carolina. See generally 3 S.C.L.Q. 178 (1950).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-251 (1962).
39. Id. § 45-252.
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-313(2) (Spec. Supp. 1966) states: "A security interest
which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes priority as to the goods over
the claims of all persons who have an interest in the real estate except as stated in
subsection (4)." The exception referred to appears in S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-313(4) (Spec.
Supp. 1966):
1974]
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under the U.C.C he may take priority over some creditors" to
whom he would be subordinate if he had only a mechanics' lien.
D. Property Subject to a Mechanic's Lien
Section 45-251 grants a mechanic's lien upon the building or
The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority
over
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the
extent that he makes subsequent advances
if. . .the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or con-
tracted for without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
41. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has not interpreted this section, one
court has concluded that a mortgage has priority over the security interest in the fixture
only for the advances made subsequent to the attachment of the security interest. In re
Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1963). The subsequent advance,
however, must be made or contracted for without knowledge of the security interest and
before it is perfected. See Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1319 (1962). Professor Coogan persuasively maintains
that a subsequent advance means subsequent to both attachment and affixation. The
practical effect of section 10.9-313(4)(c) is full protection of the fixture secured party.
Fixtures are normally among the last items used in the improvement of real estate, and
the fixture secured party has priority over all amounts disbursed prior to the attachment
of the security interest and the affixation of the fixture. Because the bulk of the construc-
tion loan is usually disbursed before affixation of the fixture, the fixture secured party will
recover the full amount of his security interest in the fixtures themselves.
Revisions to Article 9 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute were approved in 1972. The revisions to section 9-
313 would grant priority to the construction mortgagee over a security interest in fixtures
if the mortgage is recorded before the goods become fixtures and if the goods become
fixtures before the completion of the construction.UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(6)
(1972 version) provides:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to
subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a con-
struction mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods be-
comes fixtures before the completion of the construction. To the extent that it
is given to refinance a construction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the
same extent as the construction mortgage.
The mortgagee is granted priority even over perfected security interests. The fixture
secured party can only attain priority by obtaining the mortgagee's written consent or by
retention of the right to remove the goods as against the mortgagee or owner. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(5) (1972 version). If the South Carolina legislature considers
adoption of these revisions, it is recommended that the mortgagee's protection not extend
to advances made after he has actual knowledge of the perfected security interest in the
fixtures. The basic issue is protection of either the mechanic or mortgagee. The mortgagee
has inadequate protection under present section 10.9-313(4)(c), but there is little reason
to grant the mortgagee priority for disbursements made to others after receiving notice of
a perfected security interest in fixtures. See Fulmer Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Martin, 251
S.C. 353, 162 S.E.2d 541 (1968), and discussion pp. 848-51 infra.
10
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structure and upon the owner's interest42 in the land upon which
it is situated.4 3 The section 45-252 lien "shall attach upon the real
estate improved."'" The amount of property subject to a me-
chanic's lien should be the same under both types of liens. Even
though the wording of the two sections differs, a lien should al-
ways attach to the improvement and to so much of the owner's
contiguous property as is necessary for reasonable use and enjoy-
ment of the structure for which labor or material is supplied. Any
other interpretation would so limit the efficacy of foreclosure and
sale as to render the lien meaningless.
In Ex parte Davis4 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court
adopted this reasoning in determining how much land should be
included in a mechanic's lien. The contractor, who built a judges'
stand and a reviewing stand, claimed a lien against all of four
tracts of land which had been joined to build a racetrack. The
buildings, however, were on only two of the tracts. Granting the
lien to all the land, the court noted that the lien extended to "the
building and the land upon which it is situated, not upon which
the foundation of the building stands, but the land . . .over
which the purposes for which the building was avowedly erected
extends and on which the usefulness of the building depends."'"
The court observed that inclusion in the lien of either too much
or too little land would be erroneous because: "In the latter the
security intended by the statute would be deprived of all value,
while in the former the law would be unreasonable and oppres-
42. One question that has not been litigated in South Carolina is the type of estate
subject to a mechanic's lien. Section 45-253 appears flexible enough to include all interests
of the owner in land including equitable estates. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-253 (1962) pro-
vides:
If the person for whom the work is done or materials are furnished has an estate
for life or any other estate less than a fee simple in the land or if the property,
at the time of recording the statement, is mortgaged or under any other en-
cumbrance, the lien before provided for shall bind his whole estate and interest
therein in like manner as a mortgage would have done and the creditor may
cause the right of redemption or whatever other right or estate the owner had
in the property to be sold and applied to the discharge of his debt, according to
the provisions of this chapter.
See generally PHILLIPS §§ 186-96 for a discussion of the applicability of mechanics' liens
to various estates in land. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-516 (Cum. Supp. 1971) which author-
izes mechanics' liens on the common elements of a condominium.
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-251 (1962).
44. Id. § 45-254.
45. 9 S.C. 204 (1877).
46. Id. at 207.
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sive."47 The supreme court subsequently reaffirmed the Ex parte
Davis holding and indicated it might extend the coverage of a
single section 45-251 lien to include separate buildings on lots
which are not contiguous, when the mechanic's material or labor
is used in the improvement of each lot and the statement of
account describes all the lots."
Public property and property used essentially for the benefit
of the public are exempt from the South Carolina mechanics' lien
statutes 9 because of the absence of specific statutory authority to
grant the lien.' Even if granted the lien would be useless since
public property is not subject to levy and sale in South Carolina.5'
Frequently property used for public purposes, although not
owned or operated by a governmental unit, qualifies for a similar
exemption on the basis of public policy. 2 Privately owned prop-
erty should be exempted, however, only when the inconvenience
caused the general public by the sale of the property and conse-
quent withdrawal from public service outweighs the interest of
the individual mechanic asserting a lien. 3 Although this issue has
not been squarely presented in South Carolina, the decisions indi-
cate that property such as railroads and utilities are not subject
to mechanics' liens.
54
Similarly, property owned by the United States is exempt
from mechanics' liens.5 The mechanic furnishing for the im-
provement of federal property is adequately protected, however,
because under the Miller Act56 the United States requires that
surety bonds be posted before any contract exceeding $2,000 is
awarded for the construction, alteration or repair of any public
building or public work. The Miller Act preempts the South Car-
olina mechanics' lien statutes, and a mechanic furnishing under
47. Id. at 206.
48. National Loan & Exch. Bank v. Argo Dev. Co., 141 S.C. 72, 83, 139 S.E. 183, 188
(1927).
49. Although there is a homestead exemption provision in the South Carolina Consti-
tution, S.C. CONST. art. III, § 28 (1895), it does not apply to obligations for the repair,
improvement or erection of buildings on real estate. See, e.g., Brooklyn Say. & Trust Co.
v. Barnett, 243 S.C.A481, 134 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
50. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp. v. Morrison, 152 S.C. 305, 149 S.E. 243 (1929).
51, Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S.C. 379, 3 S.E.2d 42 (1939).
52. PHILLIPS § 180.
53. Id.
54. Compare Greenwood, A. & W. Ry. v. Strange, 77 F. 498 (1896) with Watson v.
Columbia Bridge Co., 13 S.C. 434 (1879).
55. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
56. Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a et seq. (1970).
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a United States Government contract must seek his remedy
under the contractor's surety bond.7
E. Amount Secured by the Lien
Under section 45-251 the mechanic who has contracted with
the owner has a lien in the amount of the debt due to him under
this contract.58 If the mechanic has not contracted with the
owner, however, his lien under section 45-252 is limited by section
45-254 which provides in part: "But in no event shall the aggre-
gate amount of the liens set up hereby exceed the amount due by
the owner on the contract price of the improvement made." 5
Thus, when the mechanic has dealt with the contractor, the me-
chanic has a lien for no more than the amount owed the contrac-
tor by the owner. Since the mechanic has no control over this
amount, section 45-255 attempts to protect the mechanic by enti-
tling him to payment in preference to the contractor after he
notifies the owner in writing of labor or materials furnished." In
effect the mechanic is granted a lien on the funds remaining to
be disbursed under the contract after this notice is given.' When
the contractor abandons the project and the mechanic then gives
notice of his furnishing, the mechanic is not entitled to preferred
payment up to the unpaid balance of the contract price but only
in the "amount due by the owner on the contract price of the
improvement made."62 In Wood v. Hardy3 this phrase was held
to entitle the mechanic to a lien only up to the amount due the
contractor for work completed at the time of abandonment. If the
contractor receives payment for more work than he has com-
57. United States v. F.D. Rich Co., 285 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D.S.C. 1968). "This court
finds that the Miller Act does preempt remedies under state laws or lien statutes where a
United States Government contract involves claims for workmanship and materials fur-
nished."
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-251 (1962); see Builders Supply Co. v. North Augusta Elec.
& Improvement Co., 71 S.C. 361, 51 S.E. 231 (1905). See generally, PHI.LIPS § 204.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1962).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-255 (1962) provides:
Any person claiming a lien under the provisions of this chapter who shall have
given the notice provided for herein shall be entitled to be paid in preference to
the contractor at whose instance the labor was performed or material furnished
and no payment by the owner to the contractor thereafter shall operate to lessen
the amount recoverable by the person so giving the notice.
61. See Fulmer Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Martin, 251 S.C. 353, 162 S.E.2d 541 (1968),
and discussion pp. 848-51 infra.
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1962).
63. 235 S.C. 131, 110 S.E.2d 157 (1958).
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pleted, the mechanic's section 45-252 lien is rendered unenforcea-
ble. 4
[Tihe issue [is] how much, if anything, the appellant
[Owner] owed Duckworth [Abandoning Contractor] at the
time when respondent [Mechanic] gave him notice of the lien.
This can be determined by the taking of testimony as to the
amount of damages sustained by [Owner] due to the breach of
the construction contract by [Abandoning Contractor] so as to
determine what amount, if any, is due to [Abandoning Contrac-
tor) for work done or materials furnished prior to the abandon-
ment of the contract. Whatever amount the lower Court finds
to be due by the appellant to [Abandoning Contractor] at the
time he abandoned the contract, the [Mechanic] would be en-
titled to a mechanic's lien for such amount."
Because the owner may add any damages resulting from
breach of the contract to the amount already paid the contractor,
the mechanic has little hope of enforcing his section 45-252 lien.
The risk of the loss resulting from the contractor's abandonment
is effectively shifted to the mechanic. This shift is perhaps justi-
fied when the owner has already paid the contractor for the me-
chanic's labor or materials but seems illogical if the owner is
allowed to receive materials for which he has not yet paid. As-
sume contractor has completed $7,000 worth of improvements
pursuant to a $19,000 contract and has been paid $5,000 by the
owner. Materialman then delivers $1,000 worth of bricks to the
construction site under his contract with contractor. Contractor
abandons the project, and materialman then notifies owner of the
furnishing of the bricks. Owner uses the bricks but suffers $3,000
in damages by virtue of contractor's abandonment. Under Wood
the mechanic has an unenforceable section 45-252 lien because
only $2,000 was due to the contractor when he abandoned, and
the owner suffered $3,000 in damages caused by contractor's
breach of contract. These facts are similar to those in Guignard
Brick Works v. Gantt" and Gantt v. Van der Hoek.17 In both cases
the mechanics were forced to argue that they possessed section
45-251 liens because their section 45-252 liens became unenforce-
able upon the contractor's abandonment.
64. See text accompanying notes 169-71 infra for a discussion of mechanic's cause of
action against contractor.
65. 235 S.C. at 147, 110 S.E.2d at 164 (1959).
66. 251 S.C. 29, 159 S.E.2d 850 (1968).
67. 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E.2d 267 (1968).
[Vol. 25
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One of the most difficult tasks confronted by a court is allo-
cation of the risk of loss between two innocent parties. The me-
chanic has much more expertise in the construction industry and
is much better able to bear the risk of loss than an owner such as
Mr. Gantt. Both Guignard and Atlas Lumber Company were
therefore probably the proper parties to shoulder the loss caused
by Van's abandonment. If the owner is a bank or another large
institution knowledgeable in the ways of the construction indus-
try, the result in these cases appears less justifiable, and perhaps
the mechanic should be entitled to a section 45-252 lien up to the
amount of the unpaid balance at the time he notifies the institu-
tion of his furnishing. In any event, the mechanic should not bear
the risk of loss when he furnishes labor or materials for which the
contractor has not been paid. In this situation the owner should
bear the risk of loss for his own contractual damages. The owner
should not be able to avoid the mechanics' lien statutes by setting
off his damages, caused by contractor's breach of contract,
against his unpaid balance.
F. Enforcement of the Mechanic's Lien
The enforcement procedures under the mechanic's lien stat-
utes are the same for liens under sections 45-251 and 45-252.68
While these provisions are fairly straightforward, recent develop-
ments in federal statutory and constitutional law make it impera-
tive to scrutinize the enforcement scheme. Once created, the lien
"continues until extinguished by payment, dissolved by the limi-
tation of the statute, or consummated when the lien claimant
takes the steps required by law . . . ."I The steps required for
enforcement of a section 45-252 lien were summarized in Lowndes
Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co."0 as follows:
[]n order to perfect and enforce it he must: (1) give [written]
notice to the owner "of the furnishing of such material and the
amount or value thereof," Section 45-254; (2) serve and record
a certificate of lien within ninety days after he ceases to furnish
material, Section 45-259; and (3) bring suit to foreclose the lien
within six months after he ceases to furnish material, Section
45-262.11
68. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-259 (1962).
69. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 10, 96 S.E. 407, 409 (1918) (circuit court
opinion).
70. 229 S.C. 619, 93 S.E.2d 855 (1956).
71. 229 S.C. at 629, 93 S.E.2d at 860. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court
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Lowndes Hill held that service of the certificate of lien upon the
owner under section 45-259 could also suffice as written notice of
the furnishing of labor or materials under section 45-254.72 There-
fore, a mechanic need only serve a certificate of lien within ninety
days after he ceases furnishing labor or materials.7 .' This decision
made the enforcement requirements of a section 45-252 lien and
a section 45-251 lien identical.
To initiate suit within six months the mechanic must file a
petition in the "court of common pleas for the county in which
the building or structure is situated . . .,,3
The petition shall contain a brief statement of the contract on
which it is founded and of the amount due thereon, with a
description of the premises subject to the lien and all other
material facts and circumstances, and shall pray that the prem-
ises may be sold and the proceeds of the sale applied to the
discharge of the demand.74
The courts have decreed that the petition shall be liberally con-
strued to make all necessary allegations and in fact need not
contain an allegation of the contract. 75 Although the owner may
counterclaim to recover damages for the mechanic's failure to
has used the term "perfection" in numerous cases, this writer has found the term to be of
little legal significance and quite confusing. The lien is created; it attaches for the purpose
of priority over other encumbrances; and the statutes require certain procedures for the
enforcement of the lien. If the mechanic follows all the necessary procedures for enforce-
ment, thereby avoiding dissolution of the lien, he has brought suit to foreclose the lien.
Therefore, the only time at which a "perfected lien" has any legal significance is between
the commencement of the suit and foreclosure. From the cases in which the court refers
to a lien as "perfected," it appears that the court means it has not yet been dissolved by
virtue of a failure to meet the enforcement requirements.
72. 229 S.C. at 636, 93 S.E.2d at 863.
72.1. The ninety day requirement necessitates a determination of when the mechanic
ceases to furnish labor or materials. In Wood v. Hardy, 235 S.C. 131, 110 S.E.2d 157 (1959)
the mechanic completed construction on September 8, 1956. On October 8, 1956, he
connected the kitchen sink to the septic tank with two joints of pipe. The mechanic
recorded and served his lien on December 18, 1956, within the required ninety days from
October 8, but more than ninety days from September 8. The South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the mechanic's lien was perfected because the additional work was neces-
sary for the completion of the mechanic's contract. This is the correct result because the
contest was between the mechanic and the owner. However, as discussed infra at pp. 838-
45, the ninety day requirement is primarily for the protection of third parties desiring to
deal with the owner. Had the suit in the Wood case been between the mechanic and a
third party dealing with the owner on December 10, 1956, the lien should be dissolved.
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-264 (1962).
74. Id. § 45-266.
75. National Loan & Exch. Bank v. Argo Dev. Co., 141 S.C. 72, 139 S.E. 183 (1927).
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perform his contractual obligations,76 setoff is not permitted.77
Therefore, the mechanic should complete his work as specified in
a timely fashion before launching a suit to enforce his lien.
The essential enforcement provision is the power of the court
to order a sale of the property under section 45-276. 78 Supplemen-
tal provisions permit the sale of part of the property if it will be
sufficient to extinguish the lien, 9 and also govern the distribution
of the proceeds."0 Under section 45-261 the owner may pay the
amount of the alleged lien to the clerk of court, and thereafter the
lien on the property is discharged and the money deposited be-
comes subject to the lien.' The owner usually avails himself of
this procedure rather than risk the possibility of a forced sale.
In addition to these procedural concerns, a crucial considera-
tion in the enforcement of a mechanic's lien is compliance with
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. In
Fuentes v. Shevins2 the United States Supreme Court held that
prejudgment replevin statutes in Pennsylvania and Florida "work
a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as
they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before
chattels are taken from the possessor." In the context of me-
chanics' liens, the critical question is whether the attachment of
the lien deprives the owner of a significant property interest,
requiring that he be afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard. A recent federal district court case84 held the Massachu-
setts prejudgment attachment scheme to be in violation of the
fourteenth amendment:
[E]ven viewing the attachment as a non-possessory lien ...
or as merely an encumbrance or cloud on the title .... the
interest created by the attachment operates as a superior inter-
est against subsequent purchasers, mortgagees or attaching
76. Spears v. Du Rant, 76 S.C. 19, 56 S.E. 652 (1907); Tenney v. Anderson Water,
Light & Power Co., 69 S.C. 430, 48 S.E. 457 (1904).
77. W.L. Brissey Lumber Co. v. Crowther, 135 S.C. 131, 133 S.E. 208 (1926).
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-276 (1962) states: "If the lien is established in favor of any
of the creditors whose claims are presented the court shall order a sale of the property to
be made by such officer as may be authorized by law to make sales of property."
79. Id. § 45-277.
80. Id. §§ 45-279 to -281.
81. Id. § 45-261.
82. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
83. Id. at 96.
84. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 42
U.S.L.W. 2132 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 1973).
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creditors, and thus restricts the owner's ability to sell or mort-
gage the property at its full value. The determinative impact of
the attachment is that it deprives the owner of a property right
or interest significant not only to him in his use of the property
but to the attaching party as well."
The language of both the Massachusetts case and Fuentes is
broad enough to include the mechanic's cloud on owner's title
after attachment of the lien. Apparently the fact that the me-
chanic is theoretically improving the value of the owner's prop-
erty in the amount of his lien is of little consequence. If the right
to freely alienate one's property is a significant property interest,
the owner must be afforded an opportunity to be heard when this
interest is restricted by the attachment" of a mechanic's lien. 7
Until the uncertainty surrounding Fuentes is clarified by future
decisions,8" it is recommended that the mechanic hold a Fuentes
judicial hearing 9 with the owner before recordation of the state-
ment of account to ensure compliance with the fourteenth
amendment.
In addition to this federal constitutional problem certain
mechanics must make disclosures concerning any finance charge
and the consumer's right of rescission in accordance with title I
of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA). 1 Title I
of the CCPA is better known as the Truth in Lending Act. Section
105 of the Truth in Lending Act 9' authorizes the Federal Reserve
Board to promulgate regulations enforcing the Act. Sections
85. Id.
86. See discussion at pp. 838-45 infra stating that the South Carolina mechanics' lien
attaches upon recordation of the statement of account.
87. See 1973 LAw & Soc. 0. 497 for an extended discussion of this problem by a
writer who concludes that the Arizona mechanics' lien statutes are unconstitutional. The
Arizona and South Carolina statutes are substantially the same.
88. Compare Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973), with Hernandez v.
European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), for an illustration of
conflicting views concerning the application of Fuentes to liens for auto repairs.
89. Apparently at such a hearing the mechanic must prove that he has labored or
furnished materials and is therefore entitled to a lien.
90. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (1970). The Act is imple-
mented by FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1973).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970) provides:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this title.
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other
provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class
of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to
effectuate the purposes of this title, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof,
or to facilitate compliance therewith.
[Vol. 25834
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226.6, 226.7, 226.8 and 226.9 of regulation Z describe the
various disclosures required concerning the charging of interest
and finance charges.9 2 The consumer is also entitled to receive
notice that he has three days within which to rescind the contract
without penalty or obligation, 3 and the creditor cannot perform
or permit the performance of any work or service for the consumer
until the creditor has reasonably satisfied himself that the con-
sumer has not exercised the right of rescission.94 Failure by the
creditor to make any disclosure required by the Act results in
liability to the consumer in an amount equal to the sum of twice
the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transac-
tion, in addition to the costs of the action with a reasonable
attorney's fee.95 Moreover, violation of the rescission disclosure
entitles the consumer to tender the property or its reasonable
value to the mechanic.
9 6
Section 226.9(a) of regulation Z expanded the scope of the
Truth in Lending Act to include a security interest that "is or will
be retained or acquired in any real property which is used
or is expected to be used as the principal residence of the cus-
tomer. . ... ,9 Regulation Z also specifically includes mechanics'
liens in its definition of security interest.98 The initial decision on
the applicability of the Truth in Lending Act to mechanics' liens
held that section 125(a) only applied to consensual liens and did
not include liens which arose by operation of law, as a mechanic's
92. FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6 to .9 (1973). Significantly first mortgages on a
dwelling are exempt from the requirements of disclosing "total of payments," 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.8(b)(3), and total amount of finance charge, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(d)(3).
93. Id. § 226.9(b) (1973).
94. Id. § 226.9(c) (1973).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970). The creditor's liability for twice the amount of the
finance charge cannot be less than $100 nor greater than $1000.
96. FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(d) (1973).
97. Compare FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) (1973) with 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a)
(1970).
98. FRB Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(z) (1973) provides:
"Security interest" and "security" mean any interest in property which secures
payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited
to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mort-
gages, deeds of trust, and other consensual or confessed liens whether or not
recorded, mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and other similar liens, vendor's
liens in both real and personal property, the interest of a seller in a contract for
the sale of real property, any lien on property arising by operation of law, and
any interest in a lease when used to secure payment or performance of an
obligation. [emphasis added.]
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lien." This decision was recently reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,' and an intervening
case has also upheld the application of the Truth in Lending Act
to mechanics' liens.'10 It is recommended that all home improve-
ment contractors who extend credit for improvements covered by
the mechanics' lien statutes make the proper disclosures to con-
sumers under the Truth in Lending Act.
IL. PRIORITY ACCORDED A MECHANIC'S LIEN
The key concepts for determining the time at which the me-
chanic is afforded protection are attachment and relation back.
Once the lien attaches, the mechanic has priority over all subse-
quent encumbrancers except other mechanic lienors.102 In many
jurisdictions, however, the lien will relate back from the time
of attachment to a previous event such as the date of furnishing
or the date of contracting. The mechanic is then protected from
that date.
The period fixed has not been uniform in the several States.
The larger number have established the commencement of the
work upon the premises as the moment when the rights of the
mechanic are to be protected; others have made the filing of a
notice, in some public office of the jurisdiction where the build-
ing is situate, of intention to hold a lien, the time when it will
attach; while a few have adopted the date of the contract or the
completion of the work. To determine which of these periods is
the most consonant with sound policy, much depends upon the
favor with which it is the interest of the State to regard the
claims of mechanics.
0 3
Before discussing the priority scheme in South Carolina, it
is important to outline the practical effect of the adoption of each
of the most commonly used dates from which the mechanic is
protected. The mechanic receives adequate protection when he is
99. N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUWE 99,356
(W.D.N.Y. 1971). In South Carolina it appears that the section 45-251 lien is consensual,
and the section 45-252 lien arises by operation of law.
100. N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,079
(2d Cir. 1973).
101. Gardner & North Roofing & Siding Corp. v. Board of Governors, 464 F.2d 838
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-286 (1962) states the rule of priority among mechanics.
See text accompanying notes 161-65 infra.
103. PHILLIPS § 215.
[Vol. 25
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granted priority from the date at which he contracts to furnish;
he has priority over everyone who has not yet recorded. This date,
however, works a hardship upon subsequent encumbrancers be-
cause they have no actual or constructive notice of the mechanic's
priority until he records or begins furnishing. Relation back to the
date of contract, therefore, might create a secret lien which is
"justly abhorrent to law."' 14 The mortgagee and owner receive
maximum protection when the mechanic is granted priority from
the date of recordation of some notice. As a practical matter the
mechanic does not wish to risk antagonizing his contractor or the
owner and therefore will not encumber the property through re-
cordation until it is too late to effectively protect himself."5 Pro-
tecting the rights of the mechanic from the date of commence-
ment of work upon the premises is the most equitable solution.
The mechanic is protected before recordation and subsequent
creditors need only inspect the owner's real estate to determine
the creation of any mechanics' liens. This date gives effect to
inquiry notice;"6 no secret lien is created, but a person with
knowledge of the furnishing of labor or materials is prevented
from taking advantage of the mechanic's reluctance to record.
There is no issue of prority between the mechanic lienor and
the owner because the owner is the debtor of all parties attempt-
ing to attain priority. Priority is only important in contests be-
tween the mechanic and other creditors of the owner. This discus-
sion, therefore, will resolve priority for each of the cases that may
arise between the mechanic and another creditor of the owner.
A. Priority Between Mechanic and Mortgagee
Section 45-257 is the only provision in the South Carolina
Code evidencing an intent to create a relation back for the pur-
pose of protecting the mechanic. "Such a lien shall not avail or
be of force against any mortgage actually existing and duly re-
corded prior to the date of the contract under which the lien is
claimed."'' 7 Unfortunately this section implies a relation back to
the time of contract, a situation which affords the mortgagee little
104. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 14, 96 S.E. 407, 410 (1918), (circuit
court opinion).
105. See text accompanying notes 183 & 184 infra.
106. See pp. 845-48 infra for a discussion of inquiry notice in South Carolina.
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-257 (1962). This section has remained unchanged since its
adoption in 1869.
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protection against the creation of secret liens. The South Carolina
Supreme Court has avoided this problem by resolving the conflict
between section 45-257 and the Registry Act in favor of the lat-
ter-giving priority only from the date of recordation.15 It is
therefore necessary to discuss this priority issue in terms of the
circumstances giving rise to possible conflicts between section 45-
257 and section 60-101.
1. Mortgagee Records-Mechanic Contracts-Mechanic Records"9
If the mortgagee records before the mechanic contracts, sec-
tion 45-257 clearly grants priority to the mortgagee."0 The mort-
gagee need only be concerned about subsequent disbursements
under a future advance clause which are made after the mechanic
records and notifies the mortgagee."'
2. Mechanic Contracts-Mechanic Records-Mortgagee Records
In this situation the mechanic will always have priority over
the mortgagee. Recording the statement of account gives record
notice to all subsequent encumbrancers, entitling the mechanic
to protection from the date of recordation.
m2
3. Mechanic Contracts-Mortgagee Records-Mechanic Records
This situation poses the problem of relation back from the
time of attachment to a prior date for the purpose of granting the
mechanic priority over intervening encumbrancers. The land-
mark South Carolina decision on the time of attachment and
relation back of a mechanic's lien is Williamson v. Hotel
Melrose, "3 in which the supreme court in a 3-1 decision held that
the mechanic's lien attaches upon recordation in accordance with
the registry statutes and does not relate back to the date of the
contract under which the lien is claimed. During the first six
108. Id. § 60-101. See Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 96 S.E. 407 (1918).
109. Recordation by the mechanic is recordation of the statement of account of the
amount due under section 45-259. See discussion pp. 838-45 infra.
110. Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. at 22, 96 S.E. at 412 (circuit court opin-
ion). This interpretation of section 45-257 is unaffected by the conflict with the Registry
Act.
111. Fulmer Bldg. Supplies, Inc. v. Martin, 251 S.C. 353, 162 S.E.2d 641 (1968). See
discussion accompanying notes 150-60 infra.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 60-101 (1962).
113. 110 S.C. 1, 96 S.E. 407 (1918).
[Vol. 25
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months of 1914, Hotel Melrose, a South Carolina corporation,
entered into several contracts with various persons for materials
to be furnished and labor to be performed in the construction of
a hotel. Several mechanics entered into contracts with Hotel Mel-
rose between July 5, 1913, and May 19, 1914. Work on the build-
ing was begun in early 1914 and completed in 1915. On July 1,
1914, Hotel Melrose executed to Williamson and others as trus-
tees a $35,000 mortgage, secured by that portion of the hotel site
upon which the building was erected. All mechanics furnished
materials and labor before and after July 1, 1914, but the state-
ments of material furnished and labor done were recorded after
that date.
The mechanic lienors contended "that their liens relate[d]
to the date of the contracts under which labor was performed or
materials furnished, and that, therefore, they [were] prior in
rank to the mortgage." ' The mortgagee argued that the Registry
Act ' 5 required mechanics to record their liens to render them
effective against subsequent creditors and that section 4117116
114. Id. at 8, 96 S.E. at 409 (circuit court opinion).
115. S.C. CODE § 3542, Vol. 1 (1912) provides in part:
[AIII statutory liens on buildings and lands for materials or labor furnished on
them . .. shall be valid, so as to affect from the time of such delivery or
execution the rights of subsequent creditors (whether lien creditors or simple
contract creditors) or purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, only
when recorded within ten days from the time of such delivery or execution ....
Provided nevertheless, That the recording and record of the above mentioned
deeds or instruments of writing subsequent to the expiration of said ten days
shall, from the date of such record, operate as notice to all who may subse-
quently thereto become creditors or purchasers.
The only major alteration to this section in the 1962 Code is the elimination of the ten
day requirement.
[AIl statutory liens on buildings and lands for materials or labor furnished on
them . ..shall be valid so as to affect the rights of subsequent creditors
(whether lien creditors or simple contract creditors) or purchasers for valuable
consideration without notice only from the day and hour when they are recorded
.... S.C. ConE ANN. § 60-101 (1962).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-259 (1962) provides:
Such a lien shall be dissolved unless the person desiring to avail himself thereof,
within ninety days after he ceases to labor on or furnish labor or materials for
such building or structure, serves upon the owner or, in the event the owner
cannot be found, upon the person in possession and files in the office of the
register of mesne conveyances or clerk of court of the county in which the
building or structure is situated a statement of a just and true account of the
amount due him, with all just credits given, together with a description of the
property intended to be covered by the lien sufficiently accurate for identifica-
tion, with the name of the owner of the property, if known, which certificate
shall be subscribed and sworn to by the person claiming the lien or by someone
23
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[now section 45-259] of the mechanics' lien statutes required
mechanics to file and record a statement of account. Therefore
the mechanics' liens could not attach until the section 45-259
statement was filed and recorded, and the Registry Act prevented
the liens from relating back to the time of contracting. Circuit
Court Judge Spain, in a thorough opinion," 7 concluded that the
clear intent and meaning of the mechanics' lien statutes pre-
vailed over the inconsistent language of the Registry Act and held
that for priority purposes a mechanic's lien must relate back from
the time of recordation of the statement of account to the date of
entering the contract. Any other interpretation would render sec-
tion 4515118 [now section 45-257] meaningless. Viewing the Re-
gistry Act conflict in this light, the question becomes: should the
mechanics' lien statutes be rendered internally inconsistent by a
later enacted statute, or should the later statute be interpreted
to give effect to the clear meaning of the existing mechanics' lien
statutes? The supreme court reversed Judge Spain and followed
the former alternative, concluding that section 45-259 was strictly
an enforcement provision and that the amendments to section 45-
259 required reference to the Registry Act to ascertain all rules of
notice. Both conclusions are open to criticism.
First, the court's characterization of section 45-259 refused to
recognize it as a notice provision designed to protect third parties
who deal with the owner.
The lien statute made no sufficient provision for registry to give
notice to other persons, nor did any other statute at that time
do so. Those parts of the lien statute which provided for filing
in the clerk's office a "statement" of the amount due the lienee
in his behalf and shall be recorded in a book kept for the purpose by the register
or clerk who shall be entitled to the same fees therefor as for recording mortgages
of equal length. Provided, that in the event neither the owner nor the person in
possession can be located after diligent search, and this fact is verified by affida-
vit of the sheriff or his deputy, the lien may be preserved by filing the statement
together with the affidavit. The delivery on the register or clerk for filing, as
provided in this section, shall be and constitute the delivery contemplated with
regard to such liens in Title 60 of this Code.
This section is substantially the same as section 4117 of the 1912 Code of Laws. Section
4117, however, did not contain the clause "serves upon the owner or, in the event the owner
cannot be found, upon the person in possession," nor did it contain the second sentence
providing for service in the event the owner cannot be located.
117. 110 S.C. 7-26, 96 S.E. 407-13.
118. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 45-257 (1962) as set forth in text accompanying note 107
supra.
[Vol. 25
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...were on their face intended for part of the procedure to
enforce the lien and for no other purpose."'
A real purpose behind the dissolution of the mechanic's lien
under section 45-259 is protection of people subsequently dealing
with the owner of a completed improvement. The statute pro-
vides for filing a statement of account and "a description of the
property intended to be covered by the lien sufficiently accurate
for identification" which "shall be recorded in a book kept for the
purpose by the register or clerk."120 If the court is correct that the
statute is intended simply to be a part of an enforcement proce-
dure, the legislature would not have required recordation of a
description sufficiently accurate for identification. It is therefore
apparent that a major purpose of section 45-259 is protection of
people subsequently dealing with the owner of a completed im-
provement. If the statement of account is not recorded within
ninety days after completion of the improvement, third parties
may safely deal with the owner. In light of this purpose, third
parties have no right to rely on the fact that no mechanic's lien
has been recorded until the ninety day period has lapsed. Under
this analysis the relation back principle implicit in section 45-257
is made effective, and the mechanics' lien statutes are internally
consistent.
Second, the court's conclusion that the amendments to sec-
tion 45-259 require reference to the Registry Act to ascertain all
rules of notice is contrary to prior case law and is not as equitable
as might be desired. This issue is crucial because if reference
must be made to the registry statutes there can never be a rela-
tion back to a prior event for the purpose of priority. The Registry
Act was substantially amended in 1876 to provide that:
[Ai11 statutory liens on buildings and lands for labor furnished
or performed on them ...shall be valid, so as to affect from
the time of such delivery or execution the rights of subsequent
creditors or purchasers for valuable consideration without no-
tice, only when recorded within forty days from the time of such
delivery or execution in the office of Register of Mesne Convey-
ances where the property affected thereby is situated in the case
of real estate .... 121
119. 110 S.C. at 30-31, 96 S.E. at 414 (emphasis added).
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-259 (1962).
121. No. 104, [1876] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 92-3. See note 106 supra for the present
wording of this section in S.C. CODE ANN. § 60-101 (1962).
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In South Carolina a mortgagee is considered a purchaser,1 2
and therefore the conflict between section 60-101 and section 45-
257 is inescapable. The necessary inference from section 45-257
is that a mechanic's lien will "avail" and "be of force" against a
mortgage recorded after the date of the mechanic's contract.
23
The supreme court characterized the necessary inference in sec-
tion 60-101 as follows:
The registry statute, then, by necessary inference, declares that
the statutory lien, good betwixt the contracting parties before
any "statement" of it is made in writing, shall not affect mort-
gage liens acquired by third persons (without notice and for
valuable consideration) subsequent to the statutory liens unless
the evidences of the statutory liens had been reduced to a
"statement" and recorded before the mortgage liens took ef-
fect.1
24
To resolve this conflict, one could simply look at the most re-
cently enacted statute and treat it as the controlling expression
of legislative intent. This interpretation, however, creates prob-
lems in light of the many amendments that have been made to
both mechanics' lien statutes and the Registry Act.
In 1882 the predecessor to present section 45-259 was
amended by the addition of the following clause: "[P]rovided,
that said lien shall not be valid to affect the rights of subsequent
creditors, or purchasers for valuable consideration without notice,
unless the statement be recorded within 40 days from the time of
delivery to the clerk."'2 3 This clause was replaced in 1884 by the
following sentence: "The delivery to the register for filing, as
hereinbefore provided, shall be and constitute the delivery con-
templated with regard to such liens in [the Registry Act]." The
1884 amendment contained the standard clause repealing all acts
and parts of acts inconsistent with it. In Murphy v. Valk'l2 the
court held that this amendment entitled the mechanics' lien stat-
utes to be treated as being enacted more recently than the Regis-
try Act. The conflict in that case involved the requirement in the
Registry Act that the execution of the statement be proved by the
122. See note 139 infra.
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-257 (1962) as set forth in text accompanying note 107
supra.
124, 110 S.C. at 132, 96 S.E. at 410.
125. S.C. GEN. STAT. § 2354 (1882).
126. No. 505, [18841 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 822.
127. 30 S.C. 262, 9 S.E. 101 (1889).
[Vol. 25
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affidavit of a subscribing witness,'12 while the mechanics' lien
statutes required only that the statement be subscribed and
sworn-to by the person claiming the lien.' 21 The court initially
found that there was no conflict between the statutes but as an
alternative holding described the effect of the 1884 amendment
as follows:
But if we are mistaken in this, and there is real conflict betwen
the acts as to the proof necessary for recording a mechanic's lien,
we suppose that there can be no doubt that the amendment of
the mechanic's act (1884), being subsequent to the registry law
(1876), repealed any provision in that law which was inconsist-
ent with it. The second section of the amendment declares "that
all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act, are hereby
repealed." The special provisions of this act, as to the manner
of recording a mechanic's lien, is the law which must govern,
and as we think this has been the unvarying practice heretofore
to all such cases, we cannot say that the judge below committed
error in holding that the lien was legally "recorded." '
Looking exclusively at the time of enactment or amendment to
resolve statutory conflicts is an exercise in futility, with the trav-
elling trophy being awarded to the most recently amended stat-
ute. Priority between the mechanic and mortgagee would change
each time the Registry Act or the mechanics' lien statutes were
amended. Perhaps realizing the commercial impracticability of
such a solution, the supreme court in Williamson made no refer-
ence to the Murphy decision.
The supreme court also failed to mention another seemingly
contrary case decided only seven years before Williamson. In
Drewery v. Columbia Amusement Company3 ' the court granted
a mechanic's lien priority over a mortgage even though the me-
chanic's statement of account was probably recorded after the
recordation of the mortgage. 32 Circuit Judge Spain concluded in
128. REv. STAT. §§ 1776-1777 (1876).
129. REv. STAT. § 2354 (1876), as amended No. 505, [1884] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 822-
23. See note 107 supra for a comparison of this section with the current S.C. CODE
ANN. § 45-259 (1962).
130. 30 S.C. at 269-70, 9 S.E. at 104.
131. 87 S.C. 445, 69 S.E. 879, 1094 (1911).
132. The facts in this case are unclear, but the court's failure to mention the Registry
Act indicates that the mechanic's statement of account was recorded after the mortgage.
The master finds that the last item in the account of that company, for materi-
als furnished, is dated the 22d of May, 1909; the mortgage was executed on the
14th and recorded on the 15th of June, 1909; the said company filed its state-
1974]
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Williamson that Drewery mandated that mechanics be granted
priority over the mortgagee,13 as did Chief Justice Gary who aut-
hored the Drewery opinion and dissented in Williamson. Perhaps
the supreme court's failure to mention Drewery was motivated by
the lack of any reasoning behind the naked result in that case.
The supreme court summarily dismissed contrary results under
similar statutes in other jurisdictions 3 because "[tihe construc-
tion of our statutes does not depend upon what other courts have
concluded about the statutes of other states; and we have, there-
fore, not considered those matters." '35 This reasoning is appar-
ently also true of Massachusetts decisions, even though our me-
chanics' lien statutes were copied virtually verbatim from the
statutes of that state.'36
The language of the statutes, the dates of enactment or
amendment and prior cases offer little aid in the resolution of the
conflicting priorities. The circuit court gave effect to the notice
provisions in the mechanics' lien statutes at the expense of the
Recording Act, and the supreme court gave effect to the Record-
ing Act at the expense of the mechanics' lien statutes. Both deci-
sions are reasonable but reflect differing policy considerations. It
is unfortunate that neither decision can be characterized as
reaching the most equitable result because the policy considera-
tions conflict as harshly as the statutory language. The circuit
court opinion would allow the existence of secret liens at the
mechanic's date of contract. The mortgagee might not discover
these liens by checking the record or viewing the owner's prop-
erty, and therefore his recorded mortgage could later be subordi-
nated to numerous mechanics' liens. The supreme court decision
forces the mechanic to record to attain priority, thereby stripping
him of any realistic protection.'37 As discussed above, the most
ment within the time prescribed by statute, and began its action, within the
required time, to enforce payment of its lien. 87 S.C. at 448, 69 S.E. at 880.
133. 110 S.C. at 13, 96 S.E. at 410.
What made the mortgage in that case inferior to the lien for materials? It was
because the date of the contract for furnishing such materials was prior to the
date of the mortgage, and the lien therefore was preserved when the statement
of account was filed and recorded as prescribed by law.
134. Id. at 15, 96 S.E. at 410-11.
135. Id. at 33, 96 S.E. at 415. See Libbey v. Fidden, 192 Mass. 175, 78 N.E. 313 (1906);
Carew v. Stubbs, 155 Mass. 549, 30 N.E. 219 (1892); Batchelder v. Rand, 117 Mass. 176
(1875); Dimkler v. Crane, 103 Mass. 470 (1870).
136. 110 S.C. at 15, 96 S.E. at 410.
137. See notes 183-84 supra.
844 [Vol. 25
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equitable alternative, unfortunately not available under the
South Carolina statutes, is to accord the mechanic priority from
the commencement of work on the improvement. Williamson has
never been directly challenged and, unless it is reversed, the
mortgagee does have priority in this situation. The discussion of
situations 4 and 5 indicates that Williamson might be limited or
overruled if the same facts were before the supreme court today.
4. Mechanic Contracts-Mortgagee Views Construction in
Progress-Mortgagee Records- Mechanic Records
This situation presents the problem of notice by the mortga-
gee of labor and materials furnished by mechanics before recorda-
tion of the mortgage. Although, as discussed above, record notice
is extremely important under the Recording Act, South Carolina
courts also recognize notice other than from the record.
Since a relatively early date in the state's judicial history
the law has been settled that notice of an unrecorded instrument
will supply the want of registration, that is, a person who pur-
chases with notice of an unrecorded instrument will not be pro-
tected therefore by the recording act. Thus the notice which will
deprive a subsequent purchaser of protection under the record-
ing act may be either record notice or notice other than from the
record.'1
3
A mortgagee is a purchaser under the South Carolina Recording
Act'31 and therefore subject to the common law rules of notice
other than from the record.
The mortgagee in Williamson did not record his mortgage
until a substantial portion of the construction had been com-
pleted. Although the opinions do not so state, it may be assumed
that the mortgagees inspected the building site before granting
the mortgage and therefore viewed the partially completed con-
struction. 40 Assuming arguendo the validity of Williamson, the
registry statutes must also be consulted to determine the effect
of mortgagee's notice of construction on the land. 4 ' Section 60-
138. Means, The Recording of Land Titles in S.C., 10 S.C.L.Q. 346, 388 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Means].
139. Norwood v. Norwood, 36 S.C. 331, 15 S.E. 382 (1892); Haynesworth v. Bischoff,
6 S.C. 159 (1875). See Means at 368, n.85.
140. All mortgagees appraise the owner's real estate before granting a mortgage.
141. The Williamson court was interpreting section 3543 of the Code of Laws of 1912
which contained only one sentence:
19741
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109 states that actual notice will take the place of recordation
only when such notice is of the instrument itself or of its nature
and purport. The supreme court in Williamson, however, stated
that section 60-109 (formerly section 3543 of the 1912 Code of
Laws) was irrelevant because the mechanics were not in posses-
sion of the real property in issue. 42 This holding appears correct
since section 60-109 only attempts to refute the concept of posses-
sion as notice and to state the requirements incumbent upon a
possessor to establish notice without recordation. The mechanic
is never in possession of the owner's property, and therefore the
question becomes: is actual notice by the mortgagee of work per-
formed and materials furnished sufficient to supply the place of
recordation under the common law?
South Carolina courts have used the concept of actual notice
to supply the place of recordation in two analogous situations that
indicate the mechanic should be protected when the mortgagee
inspects the owner's property and sees construction in progress.
First, an innocent purchaser for value without notice is protected
by the Recording Act. One cannot claim that he is an innocent
purchaser for value, however, when he has notice of circumstan-
ces sufficient to put him on inquiry of an outstanding interest in
the land.
No possession of real property described in any instrument of writing re-
quired by law to be recorded shall operate as notice of such instrument; and
actual notice shall be deemed and held sufficient to supply the place of registra-
tion only when such notice is of the instrument itself or of its nature and purport.
Code of Laws of South Carolina § 3542, Vol. 1 (1912).
In S.C. CODE ANN. § 60-109 (1962) this provision now states:
No possession of real property described in any instrument of writing re-
quired by law to be recorded shall operate as notice of such instrument. Actual
notice shall be deemed and held sufficient to supply the place of registration
only when such notice is of the instrument itself or of its nature and purport.
[emphasis added.]
It could be argued that because section 3543 was amended into two sentences actual
notice is no longer dependent upon having a possessory interest.
142. 110 S.C. at 33, 96 S.E. at 415.
The appellants cite [section 60-109] of the Code, and suggest that such
section requires that actual notice shall be deemed sufficient to supply construc-
tive notice, only when such actual notice is of the "stated" statutory lien instru-
ment itself, and they say there was no such actual notice. The respondents
suggest, in answer, that their contract was not "required by law to be recorded,"
and therefore the cited section has no reference to them. But a "statement" of
the statutory lien was required to be recorded, and therefore in writing, for
purposes of notice. We, however, are of the opinion that the cited section has
no relevancy to the case, for the statutory lienees were not "in possession of the
real property" in issue.
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One cannot successfully interpose this defense [purchaser for
value without notice], where the circumstances are sufficient to
put one upon inquiry, or where one might by due diligence have
ascertained the facts. One is charged with notice of every fact
which such inquiry and such diligence will certainly disclose.'
Applying the inquiry notice theory to the mortgagee who inspects
the owner's real estate and discovers construction in progress, it
appears that the mortgagee should be charged with knowledge of
sufficient circumstances to require due diligence in ascertaining
the facts-the creation of mechanics' liens.
Charging the mortgagee with notice sufficient to supply the
place of recordation is also supported by South Carolina cases
holding that the physical condition of land is notice of an unre-
corded easement."' The easement decisions are of particular im-
portance to mechanics' liens because neither the mechanic nor
the holder of an easement have possessory interests in the land.
One authority maintains that none of these cases expressly
passed on the applicability of section 60-109 of the Recording Act
to the common law rule of notice of an easement from the physi-
cal condition of the land."' He further indicates that section 60-
109 speaks only of possession of real property, and therefore the
common law rule seems unaltered for nonpossessory interests.
This interpretation appears to be correct in light of the limited
scope of section 60-109 and the equitable foundation of the com-
mon law rule. Therefore, even if one accepts the Williamson
court's proposition that the Registry Act must be consulted to
determine all rules of notice, if the concepts of inquiry notice and
notice from the physical condition of the land are given effect the
mortgagee should not be accorded priority over a mechanic who
has labored or furnished before recordation of the mortgage. Al-
though such a result does not technically constitute relation back
to the date of the mechanic's commencement of furnishing, in
priority contests with the mortgagee he is provided with the same
protection afforded by that principle.
143. Kirton v. Howard, 137 S.C. 11, 36-37, 134 S.E. 859, 868 (1926). See Means at
384, n.160 for further cases recognizing the inquiry notice rule.
144. Atlanta & C.A.L. Ry. v. Limestone Globe Land Co., 109 S.C. 444, 96 S.E. 188
(1918); Beck v. Northwestern R.R., 99 S.C. 310, 83 S.E. 335 (1914); Southern Ry. v.
Howell, 79 S.C. 281, 60 S.E. 677 (1908); Harmon v. Southern Ry., 72 S.C. 228, 51 S.E.
689 (1905).
145. Means at 390.
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There is little justification for granting priority to a mortga-
gee who views construction in progress on the owner's real estate
and then records his mortgage before the mechanics record their
statements of account. Several states give effect to common law
actual notice by protecting the mechanic from the time of "visi-
ble" commencement of work on the owner's real estate.'40 South
Carolina could avoid the problem of notice other than from the
record by giving effect to section 45-257,I47 thereby protecting the
mechanic from the date of his contract. The Williamson decision
not only creates the actual notice problem in South Carolina but
also protects both the owner and the mortgagee at the expense of
the mechanic. The owner is now able to mortgage his real estate
and assure the mortgagee of priority so long as the owner can
prevent the mechanic from recording his statement of account.
The mechanic will obviously be reluctant to encumber the
owner's land and risk losing the goodwill of both the owner and
contractor. 4 8 The effect of common law actual notice by the mort-
gagee upon his priority over a mechanic will ultimately depend
on which party the supreme court desires to protect-which party
should bear the risk of loss. Older decisions indicate that the
mortgagee and owner will be protected, but the recent case of
Fulmer Building Supplies, Inc. v. Martin4 9 indicates that the
court might now sympathize with the mechanic.
5. Mortgagee Records-Mechanic Records-Mortgagee Disburses
Under a Future Advance Clause
Priority in this situation is governed by the Fulmer5 ' case.
In Fulmer the supreme court considered the conflict between the
mortgagee's rights under sections 45-55151 and 45-257, 52 and the
146. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 507-46 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.05 (19,17); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1508 (1965); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 44-9-8 (1967); Wls. STAT.
ANN. § 289.01(4) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-257 (1962) set forth in text accompanying note 107 supra.
148. See text accompanying notes 183-84 infra.
149. 251 S.C. 353, 162 S.E.2d 641 (1968).
150. Id.
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-55 (1962) provides in part:
Any mortgage conveying an interest in or creating a lien on . . . real estate,
securing existing indebtedness or future advances to be made, . . shall be
valid from the day and hour when recorded so as to affect the rights of subse-
quent creditors, whether lien creditors or simple contract creditors, . . . to the
same extent as if such advances were made as of the date of the execution of
such mortgage for the total amount of advances made thereunder. ...
152. Id. § 44-257, set forth in text accompanying note 107 supra.
[Vol. 25848
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materialman's rights under the mechanics' lien statutes. The
mechanic's lien was held to take priority over the mortgagee's
advances made subsequent to recordation of the mechanic's lien.
The mortgagee paid the first three of four installments directly
to the contractor, leaving a balance of approximately $3,700 to be
disbursed in the last installment. Thereafter, Fulmer recorded a
mechanic's lien in the amount of $3,800 and gave written notice
of the lien to the owner, mortgagee, and contractor. Three days
later the mortgagee disbursed the last installment, sending Ful-
mer only $800. The supreme court understandably had difficulty
circumventing the clear statutory language of sections 45-55 and
45-257 that accord priority to the mortgagee. The decision hinged
on section 45-255111 which entitles a mechanic with a perfected
lien to be paid in preference to the contractor and provides that
after the mechanic's lien attaches, no payment by the owner to
the contractor can lessen the amount recoverable by the me-
chanic.
The statutory problem in applying section 45-255 to the
transaction in Fulmer is that payment was made by the mortga-
gee to other creditors and not "by the owner to the contractor."
The court, however, demonstrated its ability to interpret the
mechanics' lien statutes flexibly in favor of the mechanic. The
mortgagee in this case was held to occupy the same position as
the owner.
When the mortgagee assumed absolute control of the dis-
bursement of the proceeds of the construction loan, it occupied
the same position as the owner with respect to the duties and
obligations imposed by statute as to the payment of the remain-
ing funds after the perfection of the mechanic's lien. The failure,
under such circumstances, of the mortgagee to protect the me-
chanic's lien to the extent of the funds remaining in its hands
gave the mechanic's lien priority over the mortgage lien to the
extent of the subsequent advance."'
Even though the majority of the last disbursement was paid to
153. Id. § 45-255 provides:
Any person claiming a lien under the provisions of this chapter who shall have
given the notice provided for herein shall be entitled to be paid in preference to
the contractor at whose instance the labor was performed or material furnished
and no payment by the owner to the contractor thereafter shall operate to lessen
the amount recoverable by the person so giving the notice.
154. 251 S.C. at 359, 162 S.E.2d at 544.
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other creditors, the court held that it was "in effect" paid to the
contractor. '
The supreme court in Fulmer made no reference to
Williamson, even though appellant argued that section 60-101
and the Williamson rationale demanded priority be given the first
party to record.' Rather than resort to the Recording Act for a
determination of the appropriate notice and its attendant prior-
ity, the supreme court has indicated that it will seek resolution
of priority issues within the framework of the mechanics' lien
statutes. If the court utilizes this approach in future cases, it is
possible that Williamson will be overruled as contrary to the clear
intent and meaning of the mechanics' lien statutes. The me-
chanic would then be protected from the date he enters the con-
tract under which his lien is claimed.
Unfortunately Fulmer does not resolve the issue of priority
when the mortgagee has actual notice that construction has
commenced but no notice of the mechanic's statutory lien. It is
apparent that the mechanic in Fulmer prevailed because he gave
actual notice of his statutory lien to the mortgagee after recorda-
tion. '17 This result raises the question whether notice to the mort-
gagee by itself would be sufficient to grant the mechanic priority,
or whether the mechanic should also be required to record to
attain priority over subsequent advances. Is it possible to treat all
disbursements to the contractor by the mortgagee who records
after receiving written notice of the furnishing of labor or materi-
als as violating section 45-255? Section 45-255 requires the me-
chanic to give "the notice provided for herein."'' 8 The required
notice apparently is the section 45-254 written notice to the owner
of furnishing, and not the section 45-259 notice of recordation of
the statement of account.' Therefore, a mechanic can attain
155. Id.
156. Brief for Appellant at 507.
157. The mortgagee had notice that these funds could not be lawfully paid
by the owner to the contractor and that the holder of the mechanics' lien held a
preference. Yet, the mortgagee paid most of the funds over as the contractor
directed and they were not applied to the payment of the mechanics' lien.
Sections 45-55 and 45-257 were not designed to afford a shield to protect such
disbursement of construction funds by a mortgagee. If such were sanctioned, the
payment of the recorded liens of laborers and materialmen could be circum-
vented by the simple device of disbursing the funds through the mortgagee who
holds a prior recorded mortgage. 251 S.C. at 359, 162 S.E.2d at 544.
158, S.C. CoDE ANN. § 45-255 (1962), set forth in note 153 supra.
159. Section 45-255 immediately follows the provisions concerned with a mechanic
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priority over a mortgagee without recording first, if he gives the
mortgagee written notice of furnishiig before the mortgagee dis-
burses. 10
B. Priority Among Mechanics
If the amount of outstanding mechanics' liens exceeds the
owner's contract price under section 45-256,111 each mechanic is
entitled to a pro rata share of the amount remaining to be dis-
bursed. In South Carolina there is no advantage in being the first
mechanic to record a lien, but one must record his lien and bring
suit within six months6 2 to "have equal rights" with other me-
chanic lienors. This approach is an equitable solution to the issue
of priority among mechanics. It would be unfair to grant the
structual materialmen and laborers priority over the materialmen
and laborers who complete the finishing work merely because the
former are able to complete their work before the latter begin
furnishing.
In Lowndes Hill,"3 the South Carolina Supreme Court had
to determine which mechanics were entitled to a pro rata share
of the fund remaining to be disbursed. The court held:
At the commencement of the instant case the materialmen
who had in writing notified the owner of the furnishing of such
materials, Section 45-254, and had within the time limited by
Section 45-259 [ninety days] recorded and served the certifi-
who deals with the contractor and entitles this mechanic to be paid in preference to the
contractor. Section 45-255 was therefore intended to supplement the section 45-254 notice
provision and protect the mechanic after he notifies the owner of furnishing. Recordation
should not be necessary for the mechanic to protect himself under section 45-255 so long
as he records within ninety days after ceasing to furnish. The mechanic's protection will
date from the time of notification and not the time of recordation.
160. See pp. 856-57 infra for a discussion of this problem when the owner and not the
mortgagee is notified of the furnishing.
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-256 (1962) provides:
In the event the amount due the contractor by the owner shall be insufficient
to pay all the lienors acquiring liens as herein provided it shall be the duty of
the owner to prorate among all just claims the amount due such contractor.
Section 45-286 provides:
When there are several attaching creditors, they shall, as between themselves,
be entitled to be paid according to the order of their attachments. But when
several creditors who are entitled to the lien provided for in this chapter have
equal rights as between themselves and the fund is insufficient to pay the whole,
they shall share it equally in proportion to their respective debts.
162. Id. §§ 45-259,-262.
163. 229 S.C. 619, 93 S.E.2d 855 (1956).
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cate of lien thereon prescribed, and against whom the six-
months statute of limitation upon the commencement of suit to
foreclose, Section 45-262, had not run, had perfected liens
against the property and were entitled to enforce them to the
extent, in the aggregate, of the balance due by the owner to the
contractor. "'
If the lien has attached without dissolution by failure to conform
with the enforcement requirements, the mechanic is entitled to
share ratably with other mechanics so situated.
While section 45-256 is both equitable and straightforward,
it is in obvious conflict with section 60-101 of the Recording Act.'65
After one mechanic records, all mechanics thereafter recording
are subsequent creditors within the meaning of section 60-101.
The first mechanic to record should therefore be entitled to prior-
ity over all subsequently recording mechanics under the reason-
ing of Williamson. However, there is no justification for protect-
ing one mechanic over another through recordation. All mechan-
ics are bound to fulfill their contracts and should not be allowed
to prevail as a result of earlier completion and recordation. It is
doubtful that the courts would negate the clear language of sec-
tion 45-256, but until this issue is resolved the first mechanic to
record should certainly raise this argument.
C. Priority Between Mechanic and Attaching Creditor
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not yet had occasion
to construe the protection afforded attaching creditors in priority
contests with mechanics. For the purpose of priority over attach-
ing creditors, the statutes on their face protect the mechanic from
the date of recordation of his statement of account. Section 45-
282 provides that a prior attaching creditor shall be paid in pref-
erence to a mechanic who later attaches by recording his state-
ment of account:
If the interest of the owner in the building, structure or land
is under attachment at the time of filing and recording the state-
ment of the account, the attaching creditor shall be preferred to
the extent of the value of the buildings and land as they were
when the statement was recorded and the court shall ascertain,
by a jury or otherwise as the case may require, what proportion
164. Id. at 639, 93 S.E.2d at 865.
165. S.C. CODE ANN. § 60-101 (1962), set forth in note 108 supra.
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of the proceeds of the sale shall be held subject to the attach-
ment as derived from the value of the property when the state-
ment was recorded. 6
On the other hand, section 45-284 provides that if the mechanic
records before the other creditor attaches, he is entitled to prior-
ity.' Among themselves, attaching creditors are "entitled to be
paid according to the order of their attachments." '
Until the mechanic records, attaching creditors should be
protected for several reasons. The attaching creditor's transaction
is normally unrelated to the improvement of the owner's real
estate, and therefore the creditor should not be charged with the
burden of inspecting the owner's real estate to determine if there
are any possible contracts with mechanics. This result also assists
the owner in obtaining credit. In this respect the attaching credi-
tor is in a much different position from that of the mortgagee who
is financing the precise improvement for which the mechanics are
furnishing labor and materials.
D. Priority Between Mechanic and Contractor
The contractor is entitled to a section 45-251 mechanic's
lien, and therefore his priority would appear to be equal to that
of other mechanic lienors. Section 45-255, however, requires the
owner who receives notice of a lien to pay it in preference to the
contractor." 9 Moreover, in a chapter separate from the mechan-
ics' lien statutes, 70 the mechanic is given a first lien on the money
166. Id. § 45-282.
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-284 (1962) provides:
If the interest of the owner of the property is attached after the recording of the
statement, the proceeds, after discharging all prior liens and claims, shall be
applied to satisfy the execution of such attaching creditor.
168. Id. § 45-286.
169. Id. § 45-255, set forth in note 153 supra.
170. Id. §§ 45-301 to -303. The key statute for the creation of this lien is section 45-
301, which provides:
Any contractor in the erection, alteration or repairing of buildings in this State
shall pay all laborers, subcontractors and materialmen for their lawful services
and material furnished out of the money received for the erection, alteration or
repairs of buildings upon which such laborers, subcontractors and materialmen
are employed or interested and such laborers, as well as all subcontractors and
persons who shall furnish material for any such building, shall have a first lien
on the money received by such contractor for the erection, alteration or repair
of such building in proportion to the amount of their respective claims. Nothing
herein contained shall make the owner of the building responsible in any way
and nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent any contrac-
1974]
37
Choate: Mechanics' Liens in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1974
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
paid by the owner to the contractor. After the contractor has been
paid for the work performed by any laborer, subcontractor or
materialman, section 45-302171 makes it a misdemeanor for him
to withhold payment from them.
IV. ATTEMPTING To PROTECT THE PARTMS
It is the practitioner's responsibility to advise his client of
statutory rights and duties. When dealing with mechanics' lien
statutes, attorneys must work within the framework of
Williamson in protecting the interests of owners, mortgagees,
contractors and mechanics. There are certain precautionary mea-
sures available to each party in his attempt to obtain priority in
the context of modern commercial practices.
A. The Owner
The owner is the party most protected under the South Caro-
lina mechanics' lien statutes. His liability under the section 45-
252 lien is limited to the contract price of the improvement,12 and
the supreme court has construed section 45-251 to mean that the
owner is not liable unless he contracts with the mechanic.
73
Moreover, section 45-258 appears to permit the owner to avoid the
attachment of any section 45-252 lien by giving notice to the
mechanic that he will not be responsible for labor or materials
"not at the time performed.' 1 74 The owner might also defeat a
tor or subcontractor from borrowing money on any such contract.
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-302 (1962) provides:
Any contractor or subcontractor who shall, for other purposes than paying the
money loaned upon such contract, expend and on that account fail to pay to
any laborer, subcontractor or materialman out of the money received as pro-
vided in § 45-301 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, when
the consideration for such work and material shall exceed the value of one
hundred dollars shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than
five hundred dollars or imprisoned not less than three months nor more than
twelve months and when such consideration shall not exceed the value of one
hundred dollars shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned
not longer than thirty days.
172. Id. § 45-254.
173. See text accompanying notes 12-30 supra.
174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-258 (1962) provides:
The owner of any such building or structure in process of erection or being
altered or repaired, other than the person by whom or in whose behalf a contract
for labor or materials has been made, may prevent the attaching of any lien for
labor thereon not at the time performed or materials not then furnished by
giving notice, in writing, to the person performing or furnishing such labor or
[Vol. 25
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mechanic's lien by claiming that the mechanics' lien statutes are
unconstitutional because they allow a taking of a significant
property right without a prior opportunity to be heard.'7
Despite the protection afforded the owner, he must be careful
not to subject himself to liability in excess of his contract price.
First, the owner's primary concern is to avoid entering into a
contract with a mechanic, either in person or through an agent.
The lien arising from such a contract is enforceable for the full
contract price regardless of the amount of the contract between
the owner and general contractor. The owner, therefore, should
only deal directly with his contractor and mortgagee.
The owner must also avoid the imposition of personal liabil-
ity. Section 45-292 states that "nothing contained in this chapter
shall be construed to prevent a creditor in such contract from
maintaining an action thereon in like manner as if he had no such
lien for the security of his debt.' 76 This section authorizes a suit
by the mechanic or contractor to enforce the terms of his contract
with the owner.177 There is no personal liability, however, if the
mechanic only attempts to avail himself of the statutory lien.
It does appear from our decisions that the respondents are cor-
rect in their position that in a proceeding strictly to enforce a
furnishing such materials that he will not be responsible therefor. [emphasis
added.]
This section is an excellent example of the internal inconsistencies of the mechanics' lien
statutes. The source of this section as now codified is No. 144, [1869] S.C. Acts, 14 S.C.
Stat. 221, the act creating the section 45-251 lien. This section cannot apply to section
45-251, however, because it excludes owners "by whom or in whose behalf a contract for
labor or materials has been made," and as was noted in the discussion at pages 820-24
supra, a mechanic is not entitled to a section 45-251 lien unless he has contracted with
the owner or his agent. The only case construing section 45-258 would limit its application
to instances where the owner consents or agrees to the subcontractor's contract with the
contractor-a once in a lifetime situation. Metz v. Critcher, 86 S.C. 348, 351, 68 S.E. 627,
628 (1910).
Even though section 45-252 was enacted in 1896 and codified in 1916, it appears to
be the only section to which 45-258 would apply with any degree of regularity in light of
Metz. In South Carolina when two separate acts are codified, the code is the ultimate
authority and the provisions of one are applicable to the other even though the result
produced would not have obtained in the original act. Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Green-
ville Concrete Co., 229 S.C. 619, 635, 93 S.E.2d 855, 863 (1956); Town of Forest Acres v.
Seigler, 224 S.C. 166, 173, 77 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1953).
175. See text accompanying notes 82-9 supra.
176. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-292 (1962).
177. See Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp. v. Morrison, 152 S.C. 305, 149 S.E. 243 (1929).
Although a public school building could not be subject to a mechanic's lien, the me-
chanic's complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for recovery of money
under a contract.
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mechanic's lien, the petitioner may not recover a personal judg-
ment against the owner of the property or such judgment for any
deficiency that may result from its sale.' 8
Fulmer raises the important personal liability issue in South
Carolina. Assume that Mechanic furnishes and notifies Owner of
the furnishing, but Owner fails to inform Mortgagee who controls
the disbursement of the construction loan proceeds. Is Owner
personally liable for breach of the section 45-255'11 statutory duty
to pay Mechanic Lienor in preference to Contractor?' 0 Section
45-255 would appear to impose liability on Owner for any further
disbursements by Mortgagee. After Owner receives section 45-254
notice, section 45-255 appears to authorize a lien on any monies
remaining to be disbursed under Owner's contract; no payment
by Owner can lessen the amount recoverable by Mechanic. The
fact that Mortgagee makes the disbursements on behalf of Owner
should not affect Owner's liability to Mechanic. The mortgagee
in Fulmer lost priority only because he received actual notice of
the lien.'8 ' In this situation Owner is the only party with actual
notice, and therefore he, not Mortgagee, is the proper party to
bear the loss. Under this personal liability analysis, Owner could
be liable for an amount exceeding his contract price.' 2
Mortgagees and owners both desire to avoid paying unse-
cured parties in preference to mechanic lienors. Thus, if the mort-
gagee is disbursing the construction loan payments, the owner
must inform the mortgagee of any recorded mechanics' liens of
which the owner has received notice. Sections 45-254 and 45-259
only require that notice be given the owner, and therefore the
owner should immediately notify the mortgagee of any recorded
178. Id. at 309-10, 149 S.E. at 245; accord, General Constr. Co. v. Hering Realty Co..
201 F. Supp. 487 (E.D.S.C. 1962).
179. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-255 (1962), set forth at note 153 supra.
180. California imposes a duty upon the owner to withhold funds sufficient to satisfy
the mechanic's lien when the mechanic files a stop notice. The stop notice is a lien against
the construction funds remaining to be disbursed. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3161 (West Supp.
1973). Section 45-254 is South Carolina's equivalent to a stop notice provision although
the notice need not be filed. Section 45-255 requires that to avoid liability the owner
withhold payments to the contractors after receiving the stop notice.
181. Supra note 157.
182. If Owner receives notice of the lien and Mortgagee then disburses all remaining
construction loan proceeds, section 45-255 envisions imposing personal liability on Own-
er even though he is normally not liable for an amount exceeding the contract price. This
result falls within the Fulmer reasoning that the mechanics' lien statutes should not "be
circumvented by the simple device of disbursing the funds through the mortgagee ..
251 S.C. at 359, 162 S.E.2d at 544.
[Vol. 25
40
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 5 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss5/6
MECHANICS' LIENS
liens. Otherwise the owner could be held liable for the mechanic's
lien because he is the only party with notice of the lien and the
mechanic has done all that is required under the statute.
B. The Mechanic
Other than in the strictest legal sense, the mechanic is af-
forded no realistic protection under the South Carolina mechan-
ics' lien statutes because his position is untenable if he desires to
engage in any repeat business with the owner or contractor. Any
statutory scheme in which priority dates from the time of recorda-
tion will not adequately protect the mechanic.
It seems unfair to allow-indeed, to require-the contractor to
impair an owner's title, when the owner is prepared to pay his
contractor promptly. The contractor has little notion, when he
begins, whether he will be paid on time. Thirty, sixty, or ninety
days after he has completed the job, he is in a better position
to know if he needs to perfect his lien.
Still, a contractor or subcontrator may not file a mechanic's
lien unless he is willing to take the chance that he may never
be employed again by the developer or contractor against whom
he files. Forcing a mechanic or supplier to make this decision
early may be compelling many who value good-will to forego the
protection of mechanic's lien laws altogether. Hence the early
filing is unnecessary if not ineffectual, in most states.11
The dilemma of mechanics who must record to attain prior-
ity was best summarized by Phillips in 1893:
If the lien is to take effect only from filing notice in a public
office, the mechanic, when dealing with the designing, may in
every instance be deprived of the security by intervening mort-
gages and judgments. It is no answer that the mechanic may
give notice as soon as he commences work. There is nearly al-
ways, at the inception of the enterprise, a confidence on the part
of the mechanic that the owner will, upon a fair completion of
his contract, pay the stipulated price; and a party not only
hesitates, as showing a want of this confidence, to lay a lien
upon a house, when the owner has, as far as the work has prog-
ressed, promptly met his engagements, but it would be ruinous
to his business in ordinary transactions, by deterring many hon-
est men from contracting with one whom they knew in advance
would unnecessarily encumber their property with this lien. In
183. G. LEFcOE, LAND DEVELOPMENT LAWV 941 (1966).
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the large majority of instances in real life, those considerations
prevail with the mechanic, and as long as the person with whom
he has contracted responds to his obligations he files no lien.,"
In "real life" the mechanic in South Carolina generally does not
file his lien until it is too late to attain effective protection."!
In light of Williamson the only sound advice an attorney can
give his mechanic client is to record a statement of account im-
mediately, whether he has contracted directly with the owner or
with the owner's contractor. The mechanic's priority will date
from the time his statement of account is recorded. It is prefera-
ble for the mechanic to contract with the owner if possible, as this
lien is not limited to the amount of the contract price between
the owner and contractor. The decision by the mechanic to en-
cumber the owner's land will naturally depend on both the finan-
cial stability of the contractor and the mechanic's desire to work
on subsequent projects for the owner.
Since the mechanic will normally not desire to record his lien
absent some showing of bad faith by the owner or contractor, the
only effective protection a South Carolina mechanic will have is
dependent upon the terms of his contract with the contractor.
Before entering into such a contract the mechanic or his attorney
should investigate the financial stability of the contractor, the
number of jobs which the contractor is currently committed to
complete, and most importantly the reality of the contractor's
obligation to the owner in light of the agreed upon price for the
improvement.
The contract itself must specify that payment is contingent
solely upon the satisfactory completion of the labor or delivery of
materials. It should contain a clause providing for part payrhent
in the event any party prevents the mechanic from completely
performing his part of the construction.8 " Payment under the
contract must not be contingent upon payment to the contractor
184. PHILLIPS § 215.
185. See Gantt v. Van der Hoek, 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E.2d 267 (1968); Guignard Brick
Works v. Gantt, 251 S.C. 29, 159 S.E.2d 850 (1968).
186. S.C, CoDs ANN. § 45-275 (1962) provides:
When the owner fails to perform his part of the contract and by reason
thereof the other party, without his own default, is prevented from completely
performing his part, he shall be entitled to a reasonable compensation for as
much as he has performed in proportion to the price stipulated for the whole
and the court shall adjust his claim accordingly.
The mechanic should draft a clause similar to this section to provide for the contractor's
failure to perform.
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from either the owner or mortgagee. By failing to record before
the mortgagee, the mechanic is forced to look to his contractor for
payment,' and any contingencies resting on other contractual
obligations of the contractor could only lead to avoidance of lia-
bility by the contractor.
A problem could develop under section 45-2588 if the owner
gives the mechanic notice that he will not be responsible for any
further labor or materials furnished by the mechanic. If the me-
chanic does not desire to furnish without the protection of the
mechanics' lien statutes, he is placed in the dilemma of risking a
breach of his contract with the contractor. Therefore, the me-
chanic should include a clause in his contract stating that he is
relieved of all obligations should the owner give section 45-258
notice.
Once the mechanic decides to record his lien, it is essential
that he give notice to the mortgagee and contractor as well as the
owner. Fulmer applies to "the particular facts of this case
. and the most important fact was the mortgagee's re-
ceipt of notice of the lien. The mechanic, therefore, should serve
written notice upon both the mortgagee and the contractor. This
notice enables the mechanic to obtain priority as to subsequent
advances from the mortgagee and subjects the contractor to pos-
sible liability under sections 45-301 to 45-303.111
Unfortunately, most mechanics will not be greatly concerned
with protection until the deal has fallen through and all parties
begin fighting for priority. If the mechanic contracted before the
mortgage was recorded, it is recommended that the mechanic's
attorney claim priority by arguing that Williamson be overruled
as an unjustified limitation on the plain intent of the drafters of
the mechanic's lien statutes. In light of Guignard and Van der
Hoek this approach is preferable to asserting a section 45-251 lien
unless the mechanic contracted directly with the owner and all
conditions of the contract have been met. If the construction
187. The mechanic will only be able to recover the amount of the owner's contract
price. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1962).
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-258 (1962), set forth at note 174 supra.
189. 251 S.C. at 369, 162 S.E.2d at 544.
190. Section 45-301 requires the contractor pay mechanics "in proportion to the
amount of their respective claims" rather than according to the priority of their respective
claims. It is extremely doubtful that the courts would or should require contractors to pay
perfected lienholders in preference to others, since section 45-301 is a criminal statute and
should not subject contractors to liability unless they come within the clear statutory
prohibition. However, by serving notice on the contractor, the mechanic should be entitled
to a proportionate share of subsequeht advances, and the contractor should not be able
to pay the entire amount to other mechanics.
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mortgagee has actual notice of the mechanic's laboring or furnish-
ing before the mortgage is recorded, the mechanic's attorney
should claim priority under the South Carolina common law in-
quiry notice cases.
C. The Mortgagee
The mortgagee is primarily concerned with his priority over
mechanics in two situations: first, when the mortgage is recorded
before construction commences, and second, when the mortgage
is recorded after construction commences, the contractor subordi-
nates his lien to the mortgage for labor and materials furnished
up to that point, and then the mechanic subsequently furnishes
labor and materials. In both situations the mortgagee's priority
over mechanics will depend on the continued validity of
Williamson. It is therefore recommended that the mortgagee at-
tempt to obtain a waiver of lien from all mechanics who have
contracted before the mortgage is recorded.
In light of Fulmer it is apparent that recordation of the mort-
gage before construction commences will not guarantee priority
over subsequently recorded mechanics' liens when the mortgagee
makes disbursements after receiving notice of the lien. There is
no protection for this mortgagee, and therefore he should be ad-
vised that the amounts advanced will not take priority over the
recorded mechanics' liens. The mortgagee could avoid the Fulmer
holding by not assuming absolute control of the disbursement of
the construction loan proceeds. It is extremely doubtful that a
mortgagee would want another person to disburse the funds, how-
ever, because this control is the only insurance the mortgagee has
that the work will be completed. Moreover, most mechanics in
South Carolina will probably give notice of their liens to the
mortgagee, who can best circumvent the Fulmer problem by pay-
ing the mechanic whose lien has attached.
It is not unusual for the mortgagee to enter the picture after
construction has begun. In the construction loan agreement the
owner subordinates his fee simple title to the equitable interest
of the mortgagee. The mortgagee should also obtain a subordina-
tion agreement from the contractor and, if possible, a waiver of
lien from all mechanics. Under Williamson the mortgagee need
merely check the record of mesne conveyances to ascertain if
there are any prior encumbrances on the land. The mortgagee
takes subject to all prior recorded mechanics' liens but has prior-
ity over all unrecorded liens. Williamson, however, fails to resolve
the issue of actual notice. All mortgagees inspect the real estate
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before granting a mortgage, and it is possible that this inspection
may constitute sufficient notice of possible mechanics' liens to
accord those mechanics then furnishing priority over the mortga-
gee. 9 ' It is recommended that the mortgagee attempt to obtain
both a waiver of lien from all mechanics' furnishing before re-
cordation of the mortgage and also an indemnification agreement
from the owner for protection in the event a mechanic's lien is
foreclosed.
D. The Contractor
The contractor is entitled to a section 45-251 lien by virtue
of his contract with the owner. For that reason the mortgagee
usually requires that the contractor subordinate his claim to the
mortgage. After the contractor enters into this subordination
agreement, there is little that can be done to protect him under
the mechanics' lien statutes; the contractor's best protection is
derived from the provisions of his contract with the owner. It is
beyond the scope of this article to enumerate the countless provi-
sions necessary in this contract to protect the contractor. He
should, however, be extremely cautious in subordinating to the
mortgagee all his rights in his contract with the owner.' 2 The
contractor should also require that the owner or mortgagee notify
him in writing of any recorded mechanic lienors.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to recent legislation, '93 a major problem with the
South Carolina mechanics' lien statutes has not been the pay-
ment of attorneys representing mechanics, but rather the lack of
viable protection for mechanics. Under South Carolina's existing
statutes, the only way to afford meaningful protection to mechan-
ics is to have the lien relate back to the time of contracting for
the purpose of priority over a mortgagee. The mechanic then has
a lien that need not be recorded until the labor or materials have
been furnished and avoids the unnecessary ill will created by
191. See discussion at text accompanying notes 138-49 supra.
192. For example, the contract might include a provision for additions to the building
at the owner's option. If the owner exercises this option and thereafter becomes judgment
proof, the contractor would not want his claim to the additions subordinate to a mortgage
sufficient to finance only the original building without additions.
193. No. 75, [1973] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 80.
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having to file a lien.'94
The inconsistencies in the mechanics' lien statutes are so
abundant and so widely scattered throughout the Code that a
complete revision into a cogent statutory scheme is necessary.
The vast majority of other jurisdictions9 5 protect the mechanic
194. PHILLIPS § 215 states:
If it be the intention to offer them [mechanics] a real protection, the com-
mencement of the work is the period from which the lien should date ...
PWJhen the commencement of the building is adopted as the inception of the
lien, the mechanic is secured, without being forced to display this want of
confidence, which usually would embitter the parties, and render their subse-
quent dealings, in the completion of the contract, otherwise than harmonious.
This reasoning also applies to protection extended from the date of the mechanic's con-
tract.
195. The various times from which the mechanic is protected in other jurisdictions
may be categorized as follows:
1. Commencement of any work upon the improvement or commencement of the
mechanic's work upon the improvement: ALA. CODE tit. 33, § 38 (1958); ALASKA
STAT. § 34.35.060(a)(1) (1962); ARiz. REy. STAT. ANN. § 33-992 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 51-605, -607 (1947); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3134 (West Supp. 1973); CoLo. REy. STAT.
ANN. § 86-3-6 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 49-33 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
25, § 2718 (1953); IDAHO CODE § 45-506 (Supp. 1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-704 (Burns
1952); IOWA CODE § 572.18 (1973); KAN. Crv. PRo. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101, -1103 (Vernon
Supp. 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 9-107(b)
(1956); MicH. CoMfp. LAWS ANN. § 570.9 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.05 (1947); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 429.060 (1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 45-509 (1947); NEB. REy.
STAT. § 52-101 (1968) (cases interpreting this section grant priority to mechanics from the
date of commencement of laboring or supplying); NEV. RE. STAT. § 108.225 (1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 61-2-5 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 141 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 87.025(1) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 1508 (1965) (date of filing the claim for the
alteration or repair of an improvement); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 44-9-8 (1967); TEx.
REV. Civ, STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (earliest of the following events: comm-
encement of work on the improvement, filing of contract or filing of affidavit or oral
contract); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-5 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-21 (1950); WASH. REy.
CODE ANN. § 60.04.050 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-17 (Cum. Supp. 1973); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 289.01(4) (Cum. Supp. 1973) (date of filing for priority over state & federal
savings & loan associations per §§ 215.21(4)(a) & 706.11(1)); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2907
(1957).
2. Commencement of work upon the improvement but mortgagee providing funds
for the improvement has priority over the mechanic: D.C. CODE ANN. § 38-109 (1967);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 507-46 (1968); N.D. CONT. CODE § 35-27-03 (1972); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § a: 44-87, -88 (1952); Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.13 (Page 1962).
3. Date of recordation: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 254, § 7 (1932) (but laborer has
priority if labor began prior to recordation of mortgage); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-7-131
(1972); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 13 (McKinney 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-28-25(b) (1969);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1921(d) (1970). 0
4. Miscellaneous: GA. CODE § 67-2002(3) (1972) (priority over every lien except those
of which mechanic has actual notice before work done or materials furnished); ILL. RE.
STAT. ch. 82, § 16 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (mechanic protected from his date of contract); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (Supp. 1973) (must record before commencing work); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3257 (1964) (statute gives courts authority to determine all priority
questions); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 447:10 (Supp. 1972) (must attach the property).
46
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 5 [1974], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol25/iss5/6
1974] MECHANICS' LIENS 863
from the commencement of the work on the improvement. Any
revision of the South Carolina mechanics' lien statutes should
adopt this type of protection; it avoids the creation of a secret lien
and actual notice problems, while not placing the mechanic in
the awkward position of being forced to encumber the owner's
land to attain priority.
JOHN L. CHOATE
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